Will the US, Russia, and China Break Their Nuclear Talks Deadlock?

The Fragile State of Global Nuclear Arms Control

As the key US-Russia arms treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), is set to expire in February 2026, the world faces a growing risk of entering a new era of strategic instability. Analysts warn that without a successor agreement, the absence of constraints on nuclear arsenals could trigger an unprecedented arms race, particularly involving the United States, Russia, and China.

The recent summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin in Alaska did not yield progress on nuclear negotiations or efforts to preserve the last major arms control pact between Washington and Moscow. Instead, Trump's push for trilateral "denuclearisation" talks involving China was met with firm resistance from Beijing, highlighting the challenges in extending New START amid fears of a fresh nuclear arms race.

China, which maintains a long-standing policy of "no first use" and a nuclear strategy rooted in self-defense, rejected Trump's proposal. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman emphasized that China's nuclear strength is not comparable to that of the U.S., and its nuclear policy and strategic security environment are fundamentally different. Despite this, China has been accelerating its nuclear build-up, increasing its arsenal from around 500 warheads in early 2024 to approximately 600 by January 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Projections suggest that China’s total could reach 1,000 warheads by 2030, though it still lags significantly behind the U.S. and Russia.

Analysts argue that China's nuclear expansion complicates U.S.-Russia arms control efforts. Tong Zhao of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted that China is a key driver of American nuclear concerns and has remained largely indifferent to the outcomes of U.S.-Russia New START negotiations. If the treaty expires, China could blame both Washington and Moscow for undermining global arms control. Conversely, if a new deal is reached, China benefits from continued constraints on U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.

New START, signed in 2010, succeeded the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and limited the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems for both the U.S. and Russia. However, Russia suspended its participation in New START in 2023 over U.S. support for Ukraine and sanctions, while also lowering the threshold for nuclear use. This has further destabilized the strategic landscape.

Meanwhile, China has reaffirmed its commitment to developing strategic deterrent capabilities, making its participation in arms control talks unlikely. In a policy document released after the Communist Party's third plenum in July 2024, the leadership pledged to "speed up the development of strategic deterrence forces," raising concerns about a potential shift from its long-standing posture of "minimum deterrence."

Despite repeated assurances that its nuclear policy remains defensive and aimed at maintaining the minimum capability necessary for national security, China has expanded its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo fields, introduced new missile variants, and conducted a nuclear-capable ICBM test in the Pacific Ocean in 2024. These developments have drawn increased scrutiny from Washington, which views China's nuclear expansion as a move toward strategic parity.

Frank von Hippel, a professor emeritus of Princeton University, expressed concerns over the danger of a new U.S.-Russian nuclear build-up and called China's expanding nuclear arsenal "a complicating factor." He emphasized the need for substantive diplomacy rather than dangerous posturing, pointing to Trump's repositioning of two U.S. nuclear submarines closer to Russia and Moscow's response of withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Trump has signaled his intention to prioritize salvaging New START, contrasting with his first-term refusal to extend the treaty unconditionally. However, China continues to resist multilateral arms control frameworks, citing its relatively smaller arsenal. What Beijing prefers is bilateral risk-reduction dialogue with the U.S., as demonstrated by the first such arms control talks in five years held in Washington in November 2023.

Analysts like Marc Lanteigne and Artyom Lukin remain skeptical about China's willingness to join a formal nuclear arms control agreement in the near term. They attribute Beijing's reluctance partly to uncertainty over U.S. security policy and doubts about the feasibility of the proposed "Golden Dome" missile defense initiative. Despite these tensions, none of the major players would benefit from the restarting of an arms race, and Beijing would especially be wary of that prospect.

In conclusion, the future of global nuclear arms control hinges on the ability of the U.S., Russia, and China to navigate complex geopolitical dynamics and find common ground. Without a renewed commitment to dialogue and cooperation, the risk of a new era of strategic instability looms large.