South Korea Reopens Nuclear Talks with Key Diplomat Choice

The Role of Minister Cho Hyun in Nuclear Cooperation Negotiations

Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyun has frequently spoken about the potential for revising the South Korea–U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement during recent media interviews. Having served as the chief negotiator for the revision of the nuclear agreement from 2009 to 2011, he was responsible for designing the initial negotiation framework used by the South Korean government. This background has made him one of the most knowledgeable current South Korean diplomats on the subject.

Cho recently emphasized that securing a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, is a natural right and necessity for a nuclear powerhouse. Similar remarks were made by Wi Sung-lac, the National Security Adviser, and reports suggest that while the two countries have significant differences on tariff issues, they have reached a provisional agreement on some clauses of the nuclear cooperation agreement, moving it to the stage of drafting a joint statement.

The Lee Myung-bak Government's Efforts to Revise the Agreement

The nuclear agreement, which Cho was deeply involved in revising, was last amended in 1974 and remained in effect for 40 years until partial revisions in 2015. However, it has been widely criticized for its shortcomings. The agreement was concluded under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act and was referred to as the “123 Agreement” by both U.S. and South Korean officials. This clause outlines the procedures and conditions for nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and other countries, with key provisions including the peaceful use of nuclear materials and technology, adherence to non-proliferation principles, and application of IAEA safeguards.

South Korean experts in diplomacy, security, and nuclear energy viewed the 123 Agreement as a “shackle.” The Lee Myung-bak government began efforts to revise it in 2009. Although South Korea was the world’s fifth-largest nuclear power in terms of reactor capacity at the time, its research and experiments on uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing were severely restricted by these “shackles.”

In May 2009, Cho Hyun, then Energy and Resources Ambassador, was appointed as the “dedicated representative for revising the ROK-U.S. nuclear agreement.” He was promoted to Director-General for Multilateral and Global Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December of the same year and oversaw negotiations for approximately two years until his appointment as Ambassador to Austria in 2011.

Cho’s Strategic Selection of Strong-Willed Diplomat Lee Kyung-ryul

Anticipating that revising the 40-year-old nuclear agreement would be a challenging negotiation, Cho summoned Lee Kyung-ryul, a minister-counselor stationed at the Polish embassy (later Ambassador to Angola), to serve as deputy chief negotiator. Lee was known as one of the “three eccentric figures” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Trade Negotiations Bureau, renowned for his bold ideas and strong personality.

He had previously been recruited by Trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong, who led the KORUS FTA negotiations, and was stationed at the South Korean embassy in Washington, D.C. This marked his second deployment to difficult negotiations with the U.S. In 2007, during the KORUS FTA talks, he voluntarily transferred from Washington to Kyrgyzstan after two years, sparking widespread attention within and outside the ministry. This earned him a reputation as having “anti-American” tendencies. In May of last year, under the pen name Lee Chang-cheon, he published The Path of Luxury Diplomacy: A Left-Wing Diplomat’s View of Korean Diplomacy, criticizing, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs worships the U.S. like a deity.”

In August of this year, he published Bravo ROK-U.S. Alliance: Escaping the Shadow of the Pro-U.S. Alliance, describing South Korea as a “zombie ghost infected with the pro-U.S. virus.” Cho Hyun judged Lee to be the right person for revising the nuclear agreement, as he was critical of the U.S. and skilled in negotiations. After summoning Lee, Cho issued a special order: “You must follow my instructions strictly and act only as I direct,” fearing Lee’s tendency to act excessively.

First Negotiations in Washington, Pyro-processing Emerges as Key Issue

The first negotiations for the 40-year revision were held in Washington, D.C., on October 25, 2010. The South Korean delegation was led by Cho Hyun, Director-General for Multilateral and Global Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the U.S. delegation was headed by Robert Einhorn, U.S. Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control. Representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Science and ICT, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power participated.

The two sides discussed a joint research plan for managing spent nuclear fuel, including pyro-processing—a technology that separates and recycles useful materials like uranium and plutonium through high-temperature electrochemical treatment. South Korea aimed to increase nuclear recycling efficiency through this method, but the U.S. raised nonproliferation concerns due to the potential extraction of plutonium.

“Suggested Linking F-35 Deal,” “No Such Memory”

Lee Kyung-ryul, then deputy chief negotiator, detailed negotiation anecdotes in his book The Path of Luxury Diplomacy. He recalled, “South Korea’s demand was not to immediately implement pyro-processing but a modest proposal to jointly research its feasibility with the U.S. and review commercialization in the future.” To achieve tangible results, he suggested to Kim Tae-hyo, then Advisor for Foreign Strategy at Cheong Wa Dae (later First Deputy Director of the Office of National Security under the Yoon Suk-yeol government), that “a linkage strategy with other issues is necessary to extract meaningful concessions from the U.S.”

The proposal was to use the ongoing F-35 fighter jet procurement negotiations as a bargaining chip—pushing for the F-35 stealth fighter acquisition in exchange for U.S. acceptance of South Korea’s nuclear agreement demands. However, Kim reportedly dismissed the idea as “unrealistic,” stating, “Such sensitive issues should not be touched.”

In a phone call on the 10th, former First Deputy Director Kim Tae-hyo refuted Lee’s claim. Kim stated, “No one proposed linking the nuclear agreement revision with the F-35 purchase during negotiations. I don’t recall such a discussion, though he might have mentioned it casually.” Kim added, “Linking the nuclear agreement revision with the Defense Ministry’s weapon purchases is unrealistic from any perspective.”

“I Felt Like Walking Out of the Negotiation Room”

During negotiations, the U.S. treated South Korea more as a “subject of nonproliferation management” than an equal ally. One South Korean official recalled, “The U.S. refused to listen to our arguments, and the frustration was so intense that I felt like walking out.”

Opinions within the U.S. were also divided. The State Department prioritized nonproliferation principles and maintained a firm stance, while the Department of Energy adopted a relatively flexible approach, considering the economic benefits for U.S. companies through nuclear power cooperation.

Robert Einhorn’s tough stance particularly burdened the South Korean side. He worried that South Korea’s acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities could lead to nuclear weapons development. He specifically criticized the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute’s 2000 experiment, which separated 0.2 grams of highly enriched uranium. U.S. nonproliferation advocates viewed this as a case that could destabilize Northeast Asian security. Einhorn seemed to believe the U.S. held an unbreakable advantage in negotiations and maintained a hardline position.

Lee Kyung-ryul documented an illustrative episode. During the third round of negotiations in Washington in July 2011, Lee read a vision statement for the South Korea–U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement he had prepared. His key points were: “South Korea’s demands are modest: to expand peaceful nuclear energy use without undermining nonproliferation, through cooperation with the U.S. Based on mutual respect and trust, revising the nuclear agreement is necessary. We believe we will work with you, so please do not let us drift away.” Einhorn, listening intently, responded sternly: “Your tone sounds like an accusation and interrogation of the U.S. If you approach negotiations with such perceptions, I must warn you. We will seriously review what South Korea truly needs.” Lee labeled Einhorn as one of the “three contemptuous figures toward Korea” (멸한 3인방), comparing him to Hannibal Lecter from the movie Hannibal—a brilliant but ruthless cannibalistic psychopath symbolizing “the intelligence of evil” with his sophisticated speech and cold-blooded nature. While I disagree with such exaggerated comparisons, many negotiators felt humiliated, describing the experience as “talking to a wall.”

No Response for Over Six Months to Park No-pyeong’s Letter

Following Cho Hyun, Park No-pyeong, former Ambassador to Russia, took over as chief negotiator for the ROK-U.S. nuclear agreement revision. In February 2012, Park delivered a sealed letter to Einhorn, proposing to accelerate negotiations ahead of the agreement’s expiration in the first half of 2014 and emphasizing South Korea’s need to secure uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing rights. However, Einhorn did not respond for over half a year. Typically, even a formal reply like “We acknowledge your position and will meet at an appropriate time” is expected, but he omitted even that.

Does the U.S. Worry More About South Korea’s Nuclear Armament Than North Korea’s?

I have met Einhorn multiple times in both the U.S. and South Korea. In 2007, shortly after my assignment as a Washington correspondent, he was one of the first high-ranking officials I interviewed. Most recently, in 2023, I discussed South Korea’s nuclear armament discourse with him at a trilateral ROK-U.S.-Japan meeting in the U.S.

Einhorn is not one to raise his voice, but he displays resolve in critical moments. Each time, I sensed that he viewed South Korea more as a “country of proliferation concern” than an ally. I often wondered if he was more worried about South Korea’s nuclear armament than North Korea’s emergence as a nuclear state.

Although Einhorn has left the State Department and now works at a think tank, the U.S. nonproliferation team he influenced remains intact. They are known for their uncompromising stance—“not even a needle can penetrate.” It remains to be seen how Minister Cho Hyun will persuade them and secure South Korea’s rights related to nuclear energy.